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THE ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION 
AFTER REVISED RULE 37(E):  
AN EVIDENCE-BASED PROPOSAL 
Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin* and Natalie M. Orr** 
INTRODUCTION 
The subject of adverse inference jury instructions has received significant 
scholarly and judicial attention in recent years.1  The adverse inference 
instruction has been called “‘the oldest and most venerable remedy’ for 
spoliation,”2 and is perhaps the most common remedy in federal courts for 
the loss or destruction of evidence.3  This is particularly true with respect to 
electronically stored information (ESI).  “E-discovery sanctions are at an 
all-time high,”4 and a study by the Federal Judicial Center found that 
 
*  Judge Scheindlin is a United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York. 
She served as a member of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from 
1998 to 2005 and has authored several seminal opinions on e-discovery and spoliation 
sanctions. 
**  Natalie Orr is a Deputy City Attorney at the Office of the City Attorney of San Francisco 
and was a law clerk to the Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin (2013–2014).  J.D., 2011, Columbia 
Law School; A.B., 2006, Harvard University.  The opinions in this Article are hers alone and 
should not be ascribed to the San Francisco City Attorney’s Office or any other person or 
entity. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Carole S. Gailor, In-Depth Examination of the Law Regarding Spoliation 
in State and Federal Courts, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 71 (2010); Wm. Grayson 
Lambert, Keeping the Inference in the Adverse Inference Instruction:  Ensuring the 
Instruction Is an Effective Sanction in Electronic Discovery Cases, 64 S.C. L. REV. 681 
(2013); David C. Norton et al., Fifty Shades of Sanctions:  What Hath the Goldsmith’s 
Apprentice Wrought?, 64 S.C. L. REV. 459 (2013); Robert A. Weninger, Electronic 
Discovery and Sanctions for Spoliation:  Perspectives from the Classroom, 61 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 775 (2012); Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations:  By 
the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789 (2010); Jodi Kleinick & Mor Wetzler, Navigating the 
Spoliation Case Law Divide, N.Y. L.J., June 11, 2012, at S6; Matthew S. Makara, Note, My 
Dog Ate My Email:  Creating a Comprehensive Adverse Inference Instruction Standard for 
Spoliation of Electronic Evidence, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 683 (2009); Lauren R. Nichols, 
Note, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Litigator?  The Varying Degrees of Culpability Required for 
an Adverse Inference Sanction Regarding Spoliation of Electronic Discovery, 99 KY. L.J. 
881 (2011). 
 2. Norton et al., supra note 1, at 467 (quoting United Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 
77 Fed. Cl. 257, 263 (2007)). 
 3. See id. at 468 (“In a 2011 study by the Federal Judicial Center, the adverse inference 
instruction was the most common type of sanction granted . . . .”). 
 4. Willoughby, Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 790. 
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adverse inference instructions were imposed in 57 percent of cases 
involving sanctions for the loss or destruction of ESI.5 
The adverse inference instruction can serve multiple functions:  
punishing wrongful conduct, deterring future conduct, and restoring the 
adversary balance of the proceeding.6  Unfortunately, much of the judicial 
and academic commentary has been muddied by a lack of clarity about the 
different purposes of the instruction.  While punishment and deterrence are 
essentially case management functions, restoring the adversary balance is 
an evidentiary one.7 
Most of the federal courts of appeals have focused on the punishment and 
deterrence purposes of the instruction and fashioned standards based on the 
spoliator’s level of mental culpability.  However, the circuits employ 
widely divergent approaches with respect to the level of culpability 
required. About half the circuits require a showing of bad faith before 
imposing a jury instruction.8  On the other end of the spectrum, some 
circuits permit an adverse inference instruction even in cases of ordinary 
negligence.9  Several circuit courts take an intermediate approach requiring 
 
 5. See Norton et al., supra note 1, at 468.  However, sanctions for discovery violations 
remain rare.  One survey found only 230 federal cases imposing sanctions from 1987 
through 2009. See Willoughby, Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 789, 849–60.  Given the vast 
number of cases pending in federal courts in any given year, the statistics suggest that an 
adverse inference instruction is only imposed in a tiny fraction of cases. See JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (2013), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013.aspx (reporting 
284,604 civil cases filed in federal district courts in 2013 alone). 
 6. See Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distrib., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st 
Cir. 1982) (“The adverse inference is based on two rationales, one evidentiary and one not.  
The evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the common sense observation that a party 
who has notice that a document is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to destroy the 
document is more likely to have been threatened by the document than is a party in the same 
position who does not destroy the document. . . .  The other rationale for the inference has to 
do with its prophylactic and punitive effects.  Allowing the trier of fact to draw the inference 
presumably deters parties from destroying relevant evidence before it can be introduced at 
trial.”). 
 7. See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that an 
adverse inference instruction serves the remedial purpose, “insofar as possible, of restoring 
the prejudiced party to the same position [it] would have been in absent the wrongful 
destruction of evidence by the opposing party”). 
 8. See, e.g., Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2013) (“In this circuit, 
when a party intentionally destroys evidence in bad faith, the judge may instruct the jury to 
infer the evidence contained incriminatory content.”); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 
F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that a district court must issue explicit 
findings of bad faith and prejudice prior to delivering an adverse inference instruction.”); 
United States v. Nelson, 481 F. App’x 40, 42 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that “where there is no 
showing that the evidence was destroyed in order to prevent it from being used by the 
adverse party, a spoliation instruction is improper”); Dalcour v. City of Lakewood, 492 F. 
App’x 924, 937 (10th Cir. 2012) (both permissive and mandatory adverse inference 
instructions require showing of bad faith). But see Reiff v. Marks, 511 F. App’x 220, 224 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (applying standard of “actual suppression or withholding of the evidence” with no 
discussion of bad faith (quoting Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Rig Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d 
Cir. 1995))). 
 9. See Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, Chairman, 709 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 899 (2014) (noting that “the spoliation inference was 
appropriate in light of the duty of preservation notwithstanding the fact that the destruction 
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more than negligence—i.e., knowledge or recklessness—but less than bad 
faith.10 
On May 29, 2014, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (the “Standing Committee”) approved an amendment to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) that sets out a standard for imposing various 
sanctions—including adverse inference instructions—for the loss or 
destruction of ESI.11  While the new rule will resolve the circuit split on the 
required level of culpability on the part of the spoliating party,12 it does not 
adequately address the evidentiary purpose of the instruction, which is 
remedial, not punitive.  In many ways, the adverse inference instruction is 
ill-suited for use as a punishment, particularly compared to other sanctions 
available to judges.13  A financial sanction—like an award of attorneys’ 
fees—punishes the wrongdoer without distorting the evidentiary balance.  
Because the adverse inference instruction can affect the relative strength of 
the parties’ positions in a lawsuit, the focus should be on prejudice and 
restoring the proper evidentiary balance to the greatest extent possible. 
The new rule permits the imposition of an adverse inference instruction 
“only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another 
party of the information’s use in the litigation.”14  This high standard of 
mental culpability deprives judges of an important tool for combating 
unfairness in many cases involving the loss of evidence.  However, it has 
not gutted the adverse inference instruction completely.  The Advisory 
Committee Note to the new rule indicates that the rule “would not prohibit a 
court from allowing the parties to present evidence to the jury concerning 
 
was negligent”); Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (finding “culpable state of mind” factor satisfied by a showing of negligence). 
 10. See Stocker v. United States, 705 F.3d 225, 235 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The requisite 
‘culpable state of mind’ may be established through a ‘showing that the evidence was 
destroyed knowingly, even if without intent to breach a duty to preserve it . . . .’” (quoting 
Beaven v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 622 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir. 2010))); Gomez v. Stop & Shop 
Supermarket Co., 670 F.3d 395, 399 (1st Cir. 2012) (requiring “notice of a potential claim 
and of the relevance to that claim of the destroyed evidence”); Vulcan Materials Co. v. 
Massiah, 645 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2011) (requiring “willful conduct”); Vodusek v. 
Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995) (requiring proof that the spoliator 
“knew the evidence was relevant to some issue at trial and that his willful conduct resulted in 
its loss or destruction”). 
 11. For the full text of the Rule, see infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 12. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF U.S., REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES 308 (May 2, 2014), in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (May 29–
30, 2014) [hereinafter MAY 2 REPORT], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST20
14-05.pdf (“Resolving this circuit split with a more uniform approach to lost ESI remains a 
primary objective of the Advisory Committee.  The Advisory Committee is satisfied that the 
new proposed rule will resolve the circuit split.”). 
 13. The arsenal of sanctions includes “evidence preclusion, witness preclusion, 
disallowance of certain defenses, reduced burden of proof, removal of jury challenges, 
limiting closing statements, supplemental discovery, [] additional access to computer 
systems . . . [,] payments to bar associations to fund educational programs, participation in 
court-created ethics programs, referrals to the state bar, payments to the clerk of court, and 
barring the sanctioned party from taking additional depositions prior to compliance with the 
court’s discovery order.” Willoughby, Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 803–05. 
 14. MAY 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 318. 
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the loss and likely relevance of information and instructing the jury that it 
may consider that evidence . . . in making its decision.”15  Yet the new rule 
gives no guidance on when judges should give such an instruction, what it 
should say, whether threshold findings are necessary, or who bears the 
burden of proof on those findings.  In fact, the Advisory Committee Note 
acknowledges that the new rule consciously declines to assign the burden of 
proving prejudice, leaving the decision entirely to the court in every case.16  
The focus of this Article is to identify what remains of the adverse inference 
jury instruction after the new Rule 37(e) takes effect, and how judges can 
most effectively utilize it.  In light of the important evidentiary effects of 
the instruction, we have synthesized our conclusions into a proposed 
evidentiary rule. 
I.   FORMS OF THE INSTRUCTION 
The adverse inference jury instruction can take a variety of forms, as 
outlined in 2010 in Pension Committee of University of Montreal Pension 
Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC17: 
In its most harsh form . . . a jury can be instructed that certain facts are 
deemed admitted and must be accepted as true. At the next level . . . a 
court may impose a mandatory presumption. Even a mandatory 
presumption, however, is considered to be rebuttable. 
 The least harsh instruction permits (but does not require) a jury to 
presume that the lost evidence is both relevant and favorable to the 
innocent party. If it makes this presumption, the spoliating party’s rebuttal 
evidence must then be considered by the jury, which must then decide 
whether to draw an adverse inference against the spoliating party. This 
sanction still benefits the innocent party in that it allows the jury to 
consider both the misconduct of the spoliating party as well as proof of 
prejudice to the innocent party.18 
Many courts and commentators discuss the adverse inference instruction 
without distinguishing between its various forms. As a result, they conclude 
that the instruction is a severe and outcome-determinative sanction.19 
 
 15. Id. at 322; see also Mali v. Fed. Ins. Co., 720 F.3d 387, 392–93 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 16. See MAY 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 321 (“The rule does not place a burden of 
proving or disproving prejudice on one party or the other. . . . The rule leaves judges with 
discretion to determine how best to assess prejudice in particular cases.”). 
 17. 685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 18. Id. at 470–71. 
 19. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In 
practice, an adverse inference instruction often ends litigation—it is too difficult a hurdle for 
the spoliator to overcome.  The in terrorem effect of an adverse inference is obvious.  When 
a jury is instructed that it may ‘infer that the party who destroyed potentially relevant 
evidence did so out of a realization that the [evidence was] unfavorable,’ the party suffering 
this instruction will be hard-pressed to prevail on the merits.  Accordingly, the adverse 
inference instruction is an extreme sanction and should not be given lightly.” (quoting 
Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *11 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 
16, 1999))); Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 23 (Tex. 2014) (calling the 
instruction “among the harshest sanctions a trial court may utilize to remedy an act of 
spoliation” and noting that it can be “tantamount to a death-penalty sanction”); MAY 2 
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Yet judges have substantial flexibility in selecting the language to 
employ, and the effects of different instructions may vary dramatically.20  
Even the permissive inference can take multiple forms, prompting one 
commentator to opine that “[n]early fifty shades of adverse inference 
instructions have emerged.”21  Some courts inform the jury that spoliation 
has occurred but allow the jury to infer the likely contents of the evidence 
and decide what weight to accord that inference.22  Others allow the jury to 
determine whether spoliation has occurred in the first place.23 
The Second Circuit addressed the distinction between various forms of 
the adverse inference instruction this past year in Mali v. Federal Insurance 
Co.24  In Mali, plaintiffs brought suit against their insurance company 
seeking indemnification under a fire policy for the destruction of their 
barn.25  Although plaintiffs represented that they had no photographs of the 
second floor of the barn, one of plaintiffs’ witnesses indicated that she had 
seen such a photograph.26  The insurance company moved for an adverse 
inference instruction as a sanction for withholding the photograph.27  The 
trial judge instructed the jury as follows: 
In this case, evidence has been received which the Defendant contends 
shows that a photograph exists or existed of the upstairs of what had been 
referred to as the barn house, but no such photograph has been produced. 
If you find that the Defendant has proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence, one, that this photograph exists or existed, two, that the 
photograph was in the exclusive possession of the Plaintiffs, and, three, 
that the non-production of the photograph has not been satisfactorily 
explained, then you may infer, though you are not required to do so, that 
if the photograph had been produced in court, it would have been 
unfavorable to the Plaintiffs. You may give any such inference, whatever 
force or effect as you think is appropriate under all the facts and 
circumstances.28 
 
REPORT, supra note 12, at 310 (calling the adverse inference instruction a “very severe 
measure[]” and explicitly curtailing its use more than any other measure except default 
judgment or dismissal). 
 20. See Weninger, supra note 1, at 787 (noting that “how the judge frames the 
instruction can significantly influence the severity of the sanction”). 
 21. Norton et al., supra note 1, at 491. 
 22. See id. at 460–61. 
 23. See id. (“‘There is inconsistency in how courts deal with the division of fact-finding 
labor’ when issuing an adverse inference instruction. . . .  [M]any courts imposing an adverse 
inference instruction as a sanction allow the jury to reassess the evidence and determine 
whether spoliation occurred at all.  Other courts . . . inform the jury that a sanctionable loss 
or destruction of evidence occurred and then allow the jury to infer that the lost evidence was 
relevant to the case and would have been prejudicial to the spoliating party.” (quoting Nucor 
Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 202 (D.S.C. 2008))). 
 24. 720 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 25. Id. at 389. 
 26. Id. at 390. 
 27. Id. at 391. 
 28. Id. 
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On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the standard it promulgated in 2002 
in Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp.29 for any 
adverse inference instruction imposed as a sanction.30  However, it noted 
that “the words ‘adverse inference instruction’ can be used to describe at 
least two different sorts of instructions”31:  “[those] given as a sanction for 
misconduct and [those] that simply explain[] to the jurors inferences they 
are free to draw in considering circumstantial evidence.”32  The court noted 
that the trial judge in Mali had not imposed the adverse inference as a 
sanction, nor did he “direct the jury to accept any fact as true . . . [or] draw 
any inference against the Plaintiffs.”33  Because the judge “left the jury in 
full control of all fact finding,”34 there was no need to make the predicate 
factual findings set out in Residential Funding.  In other words, Mali 
recognized the distinction between a permissive and a mandatory adverse 
inference instruction and the need for two separate standards.35 
II.   THE NEW RULE 37(E) AND WHAT REMAINS 
OF THE ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION 
The recently approved Rule 37(e) has gone through multiple 
formulations.  On August 15, 2013, the Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules published a proposed revision to Rule 37(e) (the 
“Published Rule”) and invited public comment.36  The Published Rule 
 
 29. 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 30. See id. 
 31. Mali, 720 F.3d at 392. 
 32. Id. at 393–94. 
 33. Id. at 393. 
 34. Id. 
 35. The Sixth Circuit has agreed with the reasoning in Mali, noting that instructions that 
permit the jury to decide whether wrongful spoliation has occurred are “simply a 
formalization of what the jurors would be entitled to do even in the absence of a specific 
instruction.” West v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 374 F. App’x 624, 635 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 36. See MAY 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 324–25.  The full text of the Published Rule 
follows: 
(e) Failure to Preserve Discoverable Information. 
(1) Curative measures; sanctions. If a party failed to preserve discoverable 
information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of 
litigation, the court may:  (A) permit additional discovery, order curative measures, 
or order the party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused 
by the failure; and (B) impose any sanction listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A) or give an 
adverse-inference jury instruction, but only if the court finds that the party’s 
actions:  (i) caused substantial prejudice in the litigation and were willful or in bad 
faith; or (ii) irreparably deprived a party of any meaningful opportunity to present 
or defend against the claims in the litigation.  (2) Factors to be considered in 
assessing a party’s conduct.  The court should consider all relevant factors in 
determining whether a party failed to preserve discoverable information that 
should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation, and 
whether the failure was willful or in bad faith.  The factors include:  (A) the extent 
to which the party was on notice that litigation was likely and that the information 
would be discoverable; (B) the reasonableness of the party’s efforts to preserve the 
information; (C) whether the party received a request to preserve information, 
whether the request was clear and reasonable, and whether the person who made it 
and the party consulted in good faith about the scope of preservation; (D) the 
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applied where a party “failed to preserve discoverable information that 
should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation.”37  
The rule separated permissible judicial responses into two categories.  A 
court could “permit additional discovery, order curative measures, or order 
the party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees” without 
any finding of culpability on the part of the spoliating party or prejudice 
suffered by the innocent party.38  However, adverse inference jury 
instructions and other serious sanctions were only permitted upon a 
showing of “substantial prejudice” and “willful[ness] or . . . bad faith,” or 
upon a finding that the innocent party was “irreparably deprived . . . of any 
meaningful opportunity to present or defend against the claims in the 
litigation.”39 
In anticipation of its April 2014 meeting, the Advisory Committee 
released a revised version of the proposed Rule 37(e) (the “April 
Proposal”).40  The April Proposal came after the close of the comment 
period for the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which engendered an unprecedented 2345 comments in response 
to the Published Rule announced in August 2013.41  In contrast to the 
Published Rule, the April Proposal was limited to the loss or destruction of 
ESI and divided discovery remedies into three categories.  Subsection (e)(1) 
 
proportionality of the preservation efforts to any anticipated or ongoing litigation; 
and (E) whether the party timely sought the court’s guidance on any unresolved 
disputes about preserving discoverable information. 
Id. 
 37. Id. at 324. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See DISCOVERY SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT RULE 37(E) 372–81 (Apr. 10–11, 2014), in 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES [hereinafter APRIL 10 REPORT], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2014-
04.pdf.  The April Proposal read: 
(e) Failure to Preserve Electronically Stored Information. If a party failed to 
preserve electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the 
anticipation or conduct of litigation, the court may: 
(1) Order measures no greater than necessary to cure the loss of information, 
including permitting additional discovery; requiring the party to produce 
information that would otherwise not be reasonably accessible; and ordering the 
party to pay the reasonable expenses caused by the loss, including attorney’s fees.  
(2) Upon a finding of prejudice to another party from loss of the information, order 
measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.  (3) Only upon a finding 
that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use 
in the litigation:  (A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the 
party; (B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was 
unfavorable to the party; or (C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment. 
[(4) In applying Rule 37(e), the court should consider all relevant factors, 
including:  (A) the extent to which the party was on notice that litigation was likely 
and that the information would be relevant; (B) the reasonableness of the party’s 
efforts to preserve the information; (C) the proportionality of the preservation 
efforts to any anticipated or ongoing litigation; and (D) whether, after 
commencement of the action, the party timely sought the court’s guidance on any 
unresolved disputes about preserving discoverable information.] 
Id. at 383–84. 
 41. See MAY 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 331. 
1306 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
described “curative measures,” or “measures no greater than necessary to 
cure the loss of information,” which could be imposed by the court without 
any finding of culpability or prejudice.42  Permissible “curative measures” 
included “permitting additional discovery; requiring the party to produce 
information that would otherwise not be reasonably accessible; and 
ordering the party to pay the reasonable expenses caused by the loss, 
including attorney’s fees.”43  Subsection (e)(2) described other remedies 
that could be imposed by the court upon a finding of prejudice, again 
regardless of the spoliator’s intent.  The Discovery Subcommittee Note 
indicated that subsection (e)(2) was intended to include remedies like 
preclusion of evidence and deeming certain facts admitted.44  Subsection 
(e)(3) addressed terminating sanctions and adverse inference instructions, 
which were permitted “[o]nly upon a finding [by the court] that the party 
acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the 
litigation.”45  After finding “intent to deprive,” “[a court could] instruct the 
jury that it may or must presume the [lost] information was unfavorable to 
the party” that caused its loss or destruction.46 
The Discovery Subcommittee Note clarified that subsection (e)(3) would 
not: 
prohibit a court, in an appropriate case, from allowing the parties to 
present evidence and argument to the jury concerning the loss of 
information.  Nor would it bar a court from instructing a jury that it may 
determine from evidence presented during the trial—as opposed to 
inferring from the loss of information alone—whether lost information 
was favorable or unfavorable to positions in the litigation.47 
The real distinction then between a jury instruction imposed under 
subsection (e)(3) as opposed to subsection (e)(2) was who would hear 
evidence about the circumstances of the loss or destruction and make a 
finding of culpability.  Therefore, a variation on the permissive instruction 
in Mali, leaving all fact-finding to the jury, might still have been available 
without the need to demonstrate “intent to deprive.” 
On May 2, 2014, following its April meeting, the Advisory Committee 
recommended adoption of yet another version of proposed Rule 37(e),48 
which the Standing Committee approved on May 29, 2014 (the “Approved 
Rule”).  The Approved Rule again requires a finding of “intent to deprive” 
before a mandatory or permissive adverse inference jury instruction may be 
imposed.49  The full text of the Approved Rule is as follows: 
(e) Failure to Preserve Electronically Stored Information. If electronically 
stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or 
 
 42. Id. at 375. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 376. 
 45. Id. at 377. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 390. 
 48. See id. at 318. 
 49. Id. 
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conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps 
to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced through additional 
discovery, the court may:  (1) upon finding prejudice to another party 
from loss of the information, order measures no greater than necessary to 
cure the prejudice; or (2) only upon finding that the party acted with the 
intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation:  
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party; (B) 
instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was 
unfavorable to the party; or (C) dismiss the action or enter a default 
judgment.50 
The language in the Advisory Committee Note addressing adverse 
inference instructions differs somewhat from the previous draft, which 
permitted a court to inform the jury that it could “determine from evidence 
presented during the trial—as opposed to inferring from the loss of 
information alone—whether lost information was favorable or unfavorable 
to positions in the litigation.”51  The new Note states simply that a court 
may instruct the jury that it may “consider [evidence of spoliation] . . . in 
making its decision.”52  It is unclear whether the language change is merely 
stylistic or intended to restrict the form of jury instructions permitted.  
However, the most logical conclusion is that the new Note still permits a 
Mali-type instruction to guide the jury’s consideration of spoliation 
evidence without requiring “intent to deprive.”53 
The Advisory Committee purports to have “preserve[d] a broad range of 
trial court discretion for dealing with lost ESI”54 and notes that “[t]here is 
no all-purpose hierarchy of the severity of various [curative] measures; the 
severity of given measures must be calibrated in terms of their effect on the 
particular case.”55  Yet, the Approved Rule does exactly the opposite with 
respect to the adverse inference jury instruction, precluding its use in all but 
the most limited circumstances. 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. APRIL 10 REPORT, supra note 40, at 390 (emphasis added). 
 52. MAY 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 322.  The Note clarifies that a court may still give 
“the jury instructions to assist in its evaluation of [spoliation] evidence or argument, other 
than instructions to which subdivision (e)(2) applies.” Id. at 321. 
 53. See SUMMARY OF COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE 37(E), AUGUST 2013 PUBLICATION 
371, in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (May 29–30, 2014), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST20
14-05.pdf (comment of John Rosenthal noting that the Published Rule is “bereft of a 
standard or guidance as to when and under what circumstances to grant [permissive 
instructions], likely producing years of litigation about what the rule means”); id. at 380 
(comment of New York City Bar Association’s committee on federal courts noting that “[i]f 
it is permissible as a ‘curative measure’ to allow the jury to hear evidence about the loss of 
information and to allow counsel to argue to the jury about it, it is hard to understand why 
the court cannot properly give a jury instruction to guide its consideration of that evidence.” 
(citing Mali v. Fed. Ins. Co., 720 F.3d 387, 391–94 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
 54. MAY 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 308–09 (“The public comments and this analysis 
highlighted the wide variety of situations faced by trial courts and litigants when information 
is lost, and strongly underscored the need to preserve broad trial court discretion in 
fashioning curative remedies.  The revised rule proposal therefore retains such discretion.”). 
 55. Id. at 321. 
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Nonetheless, some discretion still remains for the trial judge in 
determining when to submit evidence of spoliation to the jury pursuant to 
subsection (e)(1) without finding “intent to deprive,” although this option is 
only addressed in the Advisory Committee Note rather than in the 
Approved Rule.56  In light of this omission, an evidentiary rule could 
provide much-needed guidance.57  The following sections discuss the 
considerations that should shape an evidentiary rule on Mali-type adverse 
inference instructions and presents a proposed model rule consistent with 
Approved Rule 37(e). 
A.   Predicate Factual Findings 
The question of when evidence of spoliation should be presented to the 
jury is ultimately a question of institutional competency.  Many courts and 
commentators have expressed concern that juries are unduly swayed by any 
suggestion of impropriety and are not fair fact-finders in the context of 
spoliation allegations.58  The Texas Supreme Court recently noted that 
adverse inference jury instructions “can unfairly skew a jury verdict, 
resulting in a judgment that is based not on the facts of the case, but on the 
conduct of the parties during or in anticipation of litigation.”59  The court 
suggested that the risk of jury overreaction is actually worse when 
“evidence regarding the spoliating conduct is presented to a jury” than if the 
judge instructs the jury as a matter of law that wrongdoing has occurred.60  
Other courts have expressed concern about conserving judicial resources 
 
 56. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 38–39 (Tex. 2014) (Guzman, 
J., dissenting) (“The spoliation of evidence, as the Court notes, is both an evidentiary 
concept, as well as a particularized form of discovery abuse.  Thus, spoliation issues are 
particularly well-suited to redress via the rulemaking process. . . .  [T]he rulemaking process 
can ultimately yield clarity and uniformity not otherwise attainable when this process is 
eschewed in favor of judicially-crafted rules.”). 
 58. See Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1219–20 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(opining that the adverse inference “‘brands one party as a bad actor’ and ‘necessarily opens 
the door to a certain degree of speculation by the jury, which is admonished that it may infer 
the presence of damaging information in the unknown contents of an erased audiotape’” 
(quoting Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 900–01 (8th Cir. 2004))); Mosaid Techs. 
Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 224 F.R.D. 595, 600 (D.N.J. 2004) (expressing concern that an 
adverse inference jury instruction “would elevate [the evidence] to an arguably unjustified 
level of importance and create a potentially insurmountable hurdle for defendants”); James 
T. Killelea, Note, Spoliation of Evidence Proposals for New York State, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 
1045, 1060–62 (2005) (noting that some “commentators fear that juries will be unduly 
influenced by destruction of evidence and will unfairly penalize litigants,” and that “the 
evidence of spoliation [can] inform[] and influence[] a jury’s decision as much, if not more 
so, than the underlying facts of the claim itself”). 
 59. Brookshire Bros., 438 S.W.3d at 17 (“The instruction is an important remedy, but its 
use can affect the fundamental fairness of the trial in ways as troubling as the spoliating 
conduct itself.”). 
 60. Id. at 13. 
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and the possibility that allowing parties to present evidence of spoliation 
will turn into a “trial within a trial.”61 
In our opinion, these concerns are somewhat overblown.  We respectfully 
disagree with the Texas Supreme Court that juries are institutionally 
incapable of drawing reasoned conclusions about how evidence was lost or 
destroyed.  While it is true that trial courts typically resolve evidentiary 
matters,62 evaluating competing factual scenarios and determining a party’s 
intent are exactly the type of functions that juries routinely perform.  In the 
words of Judge William Young:  “Few things seem more appropriately the 
province of a jury than the inference of a [party’s] mental state.”63  After 
hearing both the allegations of spoliation and any innocent explanations, 
jurors are perfectly capable of using their common sense to decide the likely 
contents of the lost evidence.  As the Sixth Circuit recently noted, “a 
permissive adverse inference instruction does not guarantee anyone a 
windfall; it leaves the decision in the hands of the jury.”64  In fact, 
sometimes “a missing piece of evidence like a photograph or video [is] 
irreplaceable,” and even an adverse inference instruction will not fully 
compensate the innocent party.65  In many cases, “a picture is indeed worth 
a thousand words.”66  Nonetheless, any instruction to the jury must be 
carefully crafted.  While the jury is surely capable of drawing inferences 
regarding the content of lost evidence—and thereby curing any prejudice 
caused to the innocent party—the jury must not use evidence of spoliation 
to punish the spoliating party absent proof of “intent to deprive.”67 
Moreover, concerns about unfairly inflaming the jury or wasting judicial 
resources can be addressed by permitting the judge to exercise a limited 
gatekeeping role through predicate factual findings, while still leaving the 
 
 61. See Technical Sales Assocs. v. Ohio Star Forge Co., No. 07 Civ. 11745, 2009 WL 
1212809, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 1, 2009) (calling dispute over spoliation allegations “the 
sideshow which eclipses the circus”). 
 62. See Brookshire Bros., 438 S.W.3d at 20 (“It is well-established that evidentiary 
matters are resolved by the trial court.”). 
 63. SEC v. EagleEye Asset Mgmt., 975 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 64. Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 178 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 65. Brookshire Bros., 438 S.W.3d at 17. 
 66. Id.  In one recent district court case, Simms v. Deggeller Attractions, Inc., No. 12 
Civ. 00038, 2013 WL 49756 (W.D. Va. Jan. 2, 2013), plaintiffs sued for injuries sustained 
on defendants’ roller coaster ride. Id. at *1.  Defendants alleged that one of the plaintiffs 
caused the accident when his hat lodged in the equipment, while plaintiffs contended that 
many other customers on the ride were also wearing hats. Id. at *1–2.  The amusement park 
routinely took photographs on the rides for customer purchase and deleted them at a later 
time. Id. at *5.  When the police and plaintiffs asked to see the photographs two days after 
the accident, however, the photographs had already been deleted. Id.  The district court 
denied sanctions partially because it concluded that plaintiffs could use eyewitness testimony 
instead. Id. at *6.  Unfortunately, the court did not fully appreciate the difference in 
evidentiary quality between photographic evidence and eyewitness testimony.  Eyewitness 
testimony is subject to attack based on memory, bias, veracity, or even eyesight.  Simms 
exemplifies a factual scenario in which a picture is indeed worth a thousand words. 
 67. Subsection (e)(2) lists remedies that appear to be punitive in nature, including 
dismissal, default, and certain forms of adverse inference jury instructions.  Under 
subsection (e)(2), therefore, it can be appropriate for juries to punish the spoliating party by 
drawing an adverse inference—but only if there is proof of “intent to deprive.” 
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inference-drawing function to the jury consistent with subsection (e)(1) of 
the Approved Rule.68  As with any form of sanction for lost evidence, the 
moving party must show that the opposing party lost or destroyed relevant 
evidence within its control that it had a duty to preserve.69  The Approved 
Rule also requires the court to make a predicate finding of prejudice before 
imposing a permissive adverse inference instruction pursuant to 
subsection (e)(1).70  However, the Rule expressly declines to specify which 
party bears the burden of proving prejudice, which may create confusion 
and inconsistency when the Approved Rule goes into effect.71  Who bears 
the burden of proving or disproving prejudice is a key question in the 
context of spoliation because it is often difficult for either party to 
demonstrate the nature and content of evidence that is no longer available.  
Some courts have addressed this quandary by employing a burden-shifting 
regime based on the level of mental culpability of the spoliator. 
B.   Burden Shifting 
Mental culpability is irrelevant in and of itself to any potential rule of 
evidence because the sole concern from an evidentiary perspective is 
remedying the prejudice caused to the innocent party by the loss of relevant 
and irreplaceable evidence.  However, mental culpability can be useful as a 
proxy for the contents of the missing evidence and therefore the likelihood 
of prejudice.72  The Second Circuit explained the interplay between 
culpability and prejudice in Residential Funding.  The court concluded that 
“[w]here a party destroys evidence in bad faith, that bad faith alone is 
sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could 
conclude that the missing evidence was unfavorable to that party.”73 
 
 68. These concerns are also ameliorated by Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which gives 
judges the discretion to limit the evidence presented to prevent “unfair prejudice, confusing 
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 69. MAY 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 311. 
 70. Id. at 312. 
 71. The Advisory Committee Note acknowledges that the Approved Rule “does not say 
which party bears the burden of proving prejudice. . . .  Under the proposed rule, each party 
is responsible for providing such information and argument as it can; the court may draw on 
its experience in addressing this or similar issues, and may ask one or another party, or all 
parties, for further information.” Id.; see also id. at 321 (“The rule does not place a burden of 
proving or disproving prejudice on one party or the other. . . .  The rule leaves judges with 
discretion to determine how best to assess prejudice in particular cases.”). 
 72. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery Sanctions in 
the Twenty-First Century, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 71, 88–89 (2004) 
(“[C]ourts have been less concerned with proof of prejudice when faced with willful or bad 
faith conduct. . . .  In cases where one or the other of these elements is less pronounced, there 
appears to be a sliding scale between the two. That is, the more prejudice there is, the less 
willfulness courts require before sanctioning a party for e-discovery violations, and vice 
versa.”); see also Drew D. Dropkin, Linking the Culpability and Circumstantial Evidence 
Requirements for the Spoliation Inference, 51 DUKE L.J. 1803, 1826 (2002) (“As the 
culpability of the spoliating party increases (from innocence to bad faith conduct), the 
intuitive appeal of the . . . assumption underlying the inference increases. . . . [T]he 
spoliator’s state of mind serves as a proxy for the contents of the evidence . . . .”). 
 73. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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Certainly, evidence lost accidentally gives rise to no particular inference 
about its contents, and evidence destroyed in bad faith gives rise to the 
strong inference that the evidence was unfavorable to the destroying party.  
Between the two extremes, however, the answer is less clear.  Some courts 
and commentators believe that negligent acts cannot give rise to any 
legitimate presumption about the contents of the evidence.74  Others believe 
that even negligence is sufficient to indicate that the evidence was more 
likely favorable to the other party.75 
Regardless of whether negligence is sufficient to justify a conclusive 
inference, it is sufficient to shift the burden of proof.  Many courts 
“recognize the unseemliness of insisting that a victim of spoliation show 
prejudice when the wrongdoer has deprived that victim of the ability to 
make such a showing”76 and have concluded that “the risk that the evidence 
would have been detrimental rather than favorable should fall on the party 
responsible for its loss.”77  Only when the evidence is lost without fault, 
such as through an Act of God, is it fair to place the burden of proving 
prejudice on the moving party.  Thus, once the moving party makes a 
threshold showing that relevant evidence was lost despite a duty to 
preserve, which is effectively a showing of at least negligence,78 the alleged 
spoliator bears the burden of rebutting prejudice—either by showing that 
 
 74. See, e.g., United States v. Laurent, 607 F.3d 895, 902 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that 
“ordinarily, negligent destruction would not support the logical inference that the evidence 
was favorable to the defendant”); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 
1997) (“Mere negligence in losing or destroying records is not enough because it does not 
support an inference of consciousness of a weak case.”); Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 
71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995) (“An adverse inference about a party’s consciousness of the 
weakness of his case, however, cannot be drawn merely from his negligent loss or 
destruction of evidence.”); Makara, supra note 1, at 684 (noting that some courts feel that 
“without a showing of willful spoliation, there is no indication of consciousness of 
unfavorable evidence, [and therefore] non-willful spoliation . . . cannot sustain an inference 
that a negligent spoliator destroyed evidence because it would have hurt the spoliator’s 
case”). 
 75. See, e.g., Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 
218–19 (1st Cir. 1982) (addressing the “common sense” notion that a party “who proceeds to 
destroy the document is more likely to have been threatened by the document than is a party 
in the same position who does not destroy the document,” and that the “abandonment of 
potentially useful evidence is, at a minimum, an indication that [the spoliator] believed the 
records would not help his side of the case”); Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 
F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[The] sanction [of an adverse inference] should be 
available even for the negligent destruction of documents if that is necessary to further the 
remedial purpose of the inference.  It makes little difference to the party victimized by the 
destruction of evidence whether that act was done willfully or negligently.  The adverse 
inference provides the necessary mechanism for restoring the evidentiary balance.”); 
2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 291, at 228 (Little Brown & Co. 1923) (“The failure or refusal to 
produce a relevant document, or the destruction of it, is evidence from which alone its 
contents may be inferred to be unfavorable to the possessor . . . .”). 
 76. Weninger, supra note 1, at 798–99. 
 77. Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 75; accord Norton et al., supra note 1, at 465 (“[H]ow does a 
party show that something it never saw, read, or possessed was likely relevant to its claims 
or defenses?”). 
 78. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Once 
the duty to preserve attaches, any destruction of documents is, at a minimum, negligent.”). 
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the lost evidence would not have helped the innocent party or that an 
adequate replacement exists. 
C.   A Separate Standard for ESI? 
One consideration in devising any rule on sanctions is how to fairly 
address technological advancements, particularly the proliferation of ESI.  
In developing the Approved Rule, the Advisory Committee concluded that 
ESI is inherently different from other forms of evidence and merits a 
different standard for spoliation sanctions than that applied to other forms 
of evidence.79  It is beyond dispute that ESI is increasing at an exponential 
rate and has fundamentally changed the practice of discovery.  “One 
industry expert reported to the Advisory Committee that there will be some 
26 billion devices on the Internet in six years—more than three for every 
person on earth.”80  Many commentators believe the standard for sanctions 
based on destruction of electronic information should be more lenient than 
the standard for destruction of tangible things.81  They argue that ESI is 
often automatically modified or deleted82 and worry that “litigants [will] 
feel forced to decide between needlessly preserving excessive amounts of 
electronically stored information at great burden and expense or later 
having to compromise lawful claims or defenses.”83 
However, the concern that electronic discovery will lead to a 
proliferation of sanctions has not come to pass.  Sanctions in any form are 
extremely rare.84  One 2004 survey found that “[i]n no [federal] case did a 
judge sanction a party for the routine recycling of backup tapes where the 
party did not know (or should not have known) of its obligation to retain 
discoverable information.”85 
Moreover, while the volume of ESI has increased, so has storage 
capacity.  In many cases a party must take affirmative steps to delete 
information rather than retain it.  “As a result of new technology and the 
accompanying exponential increase in electronically stored data, document 
retention policies are now the rule rather than the exception.”86  Jurors are 
often more familiar with technological advances than judges, and the 
difficulty of preserving electronic information, or the ease of accidentally 
deleting it, is something the average layperson is capable of evaluating on a 
 
 79. MAY 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 311. 
 80. Id. at 309. 
 81. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, Defining Culpability:  The Search for a Limited Safe 
Harbor in Electronic Discovery, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 65, 70 (2007) (“[A]ssumptions about 
how potential evidence is lost in the world of tangible things do not necessarily apply in an 
electronic environment.”). 
 82. See MAY 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 311 (“ESI is . . . deleted or modified on a 
regular basis, frequently with no conscious action on the part of the person or entity that 
created it.”); see also id. at 314 (“ESI is more easily lost than tangible evidence. . . .”). 
 83. Nichols, supra note 1, at 902. 
 84. See Willoughby, Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 789. 
 85. Scheindlin & Wangkeo, supra note 72, at 95. 
 86. Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 37 (Tex. 2014) (Guzman, J., 
dissenting). 
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case-by-case basis.  Therefore, the fact that most evidence is now 
electronically stored does not necessitate a separate, more lenient standard 
for the imposition of adverse inference instructions. 
D.   Flexibility and Judicial Discretion 
A final question implicating the respective roles of judge and jury is 
whether the court must submit evidence of spoliation to the jury once the 
predicate findings have been satisfied.  The answer, in our opinion, is yes.  
Because a central purpose of an evidentiary rule is to provide guidance and 
consistency, the instruction should be mandatory instead of discretionary.  
If the rule stated only that a judge “may” impose a permissive adverse 
inference instruction even when the predicate requirements are found, the 
optional nature of the rule would gut its effectiveness. 
In Chin v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey,87 the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision not to give an adverse 
inference jury instruction even though the defendant may have been grossly 
negligent in failing to preserve evidence.88  The court noted that “a finding 
of gross negligence merely permits, rather than requires, a district court to 
give an adverse inference instruction.”89  This unbounded discretion 
amounts to no standard at all and leads to a lopsided regime of judicial 
review.  A district court’s decision to impose a jury instruction is more 
easily reversible than the decision to refrain.  Because the majority of 
sanctions for destruction of evidence are imposed on defendants, one-sided 
judicial review on balance disadvantages plaintiffs.90  As the Sixth Circuit 
recently noted: 
When the requirements for an adverse inference instruction are met, the 
district court should issue an instruction. . . .  Although the district court’s 
findings receive deferential review . . . presumably its judgment should be 
upset if the movant clearly met all three prongs and yet an instruction was 
not granted.91 
While the imposition of an instruction should be mandatory where the 
predicate findings are met, it is also important to preserve some degree of 
judicial discretion.  The judge should be able to prevent highly prejudicial 
evidence from reaching the jury where it would exacerbate the evidentiary 
imbalance rather than equalize it.92  While Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
 
 87. 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 88. See id. at 161. 
 89. Id. at 162. 
 90. See Willoughby, Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 803 (“Defendants are sanctioned for e-
discovery violations nearly three times more often than plaintiffs.  In our survey, defendants 
were sanctioned 175 times, plaintiffs were sanctioned fifty-three times, and third parties 
were sanctioned twice.  The three-to-one ratio of defendant sanctions to plaintiff sanctions 
has generally held steady over the last ten years, even as the number of sanction cases and 
sanction awards has greatly increased.”). 
 91. Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 177 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). 
 92. See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he judge 
should take pains neither to use an elephant gun to slay a mouse nor to wield a cardboard 
1314 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
addresses these concerns, a balancing test could further minimize the risk of 
unfairly inflaming the jury.  Therefore, proof of the loss of evidence should 
not be presented to the jury if the potential for unfair prejudice to the 
alleged spoliator substantially outweighs the benefit of a jury instruction to 
the innocent party.  The court is the gatekeeper and is tasked with applying 
this proposed balancing test. 
E.   Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 
Having discussed the threshold issues, we present the following rule, 
more for the purpose of stimulating discussion than as an actual rule-
making proposal: 
 
(a) Prima Facie Showing.  To make a prima facie showing for a 
permissive adverse inference instruction, the moving party must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the opposing party:  
(1) lost or destroyed relevant evidence, (2) within that party’s control, 
(3) as to which there existed a duty to preserve at the time of the loss or 
destruction. 
(b) Prejudice.  The non-moving party may rebut a prima facie showing by 
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that:  (1) the lost or 
destroyed evidence would not have been beneficial to the moving party’s 
case, or (2) a satisfactory replacement to the lost or destroyed evidence is 
available. 
(c) Burden Shifting.  If the non-moving party cannot demonstrate lack of 
prejudice but can show that the evidence was lost or destroyed without 
fault, then the burden shifts to the moving party to affirmatively 
demonstrate prejudice as defined in (b). 
(d) Balancing Test.  If the moving party carries its burden, the 
circumstances of destruction and the likely contents of the missing 
evidence shall be decided by the jury pursuant to a permissive adverse 
inference instruction, unless the risk of unfair prejudice to the non-moving 
party substantially outweighs the benefit of the instruction to the moving 
party. 
(e) Definition.  A permissive adverse inference jury instruction is one that 
implies no fault or wrongdoing by the alleged spoliator, but simply 
explains that the jury is free to draw any inference it decides is warranted 
regarding the circumstances of destruction and the likely contents of the 
evidence, and to accord that inference whatever weight it deems 
appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The Approved Rule 37(e) is a laudable attempt to resolve inconsistency 
among the circuits in the use of adverse inference jury instructions.  
Unfortunately, the Approved Rule discounts the important remedial 
 
sword if a dragon looms. Whether deterrence or compensation is the goal, the punishment 
should be reasonably suited to the crime.”). 
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function of the instruction and imposes strict limits without regard for the 
instruction’s many forms.  Trial courts have other sanctions at their disposal 
more appropriate for punishment and deterrence.  When it comes to the 
adverse inference instruction, evidentiary concerns should be primary. 
One form of the instruction remains available to trial courts without the 
need to meet the Approved Rule’s strict “intent to deprive” standard.  
Specifically, courts may issue a Mali-type permissive instruction that leaves 
all factual findings, including the question of whether spoliation occurred, 
to the jury.  In our opinion, courts should not balk at presenting evidence of 
spoliation to the jury in appropriate cases, including where one party’s 
negligent failure to preserve evidence has harmed the other party’s case and 
no adequate replacement is available.  While some courts and 
commentators have expressed concern that juries will be unfairly swayed by 
the suggestion of impropriety, juries are frequently asked to evaluate 
competing factual theories and to use their common sense to decide which 
is most plausible.  Trial courts retain the discretion pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 403 to exclude evidence that would unfairly inflame the jury or 
waste judicial resources.  Moreover, the predicate finding of prejudice 
ensures that evidence of spoliation will only be presented in cases where the 
loss of evidence has affected the fairness of the proceedings. 
The Approved Rule gives no guidance on when courts should employ a 
Mali-type instruction and which party bears the burden of proving or 
disproving prejudice.  These omissions may breed confusion and 
inconsistency in lower courts rather than clarity.  Our hope is that our 
suggested evidentiary rule can serve as a standard to guide trial courts in the 





  Editor’s Note:  As evidenced in a September 2014 Standing Committee report published 
after the writing of this Article, the Standing Committee made minor stylistic changes to the 
Advisory Committee proposal in May instead of approving it in full.  Specifically, the 
Standing Committee moved the word “may” in the language of the rule and made small 
changes to the Committee Note.  These changes do not affect the analysis in this Article. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF U.S., SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, 
Appx. B-56 to B-57 (Sept. 2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf.  The Judicial Conference approved 
the Standing Committee’s proposal with the changes noted above in September 2014.  The 
current text of the rule is as follows:   
(e) Failure to Preserve Electronically Stored Information. If electronically stored 
information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of 
litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it 
cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the court:  (1) upon 
finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may order 
measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or (2) only upon finding 
that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use 
in the litigation may:  (A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the 
party; (B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was 
unfavorable to the party; or (C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment. 
